

Society for Philosophy and Psychology



36th Annual Meeting
June 9-12, 2010
Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon

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THE REGISTRATION DESK WILL BE LOCATED IN HOWARD 115

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WELCOME

Welcome to the campus of Lewis and Clark College for the 36th annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy & Psychology. An excellent program has been assembled by program chairs Ron Mallon and Jen Cole Wright.

There are several special events beginning with Wednesday's pre-conference workshop on Moral Judgment, organized by Bertram Malle. On Wednesday evening is the poster madness session: strictly enforced one-minute mini-talks by all poster presenters—always a lot of fun! Evening poster sessions are on Wednesday and Thursday and there will be hors d'œuvres and bar at each. An ongoing open discussion of diversity issues and the SPP has been organized at lunch time on Thursday, June 10th, with box lunches available to attendees.

The future of SPP depends on the work of many volunteers, and also on your participation. Please plan to attend the business meeting on Saturday, where the agenda will cover various issues affecting the future of the Society. (Saturday box lunches are included in the registration fee this year.)

The conference is generously supported by the Department of Philosophy at Lewis and Clark College.

In addition to those mentioned above, thanks go to all who refereed papers for the conference or served on the prize committees. Special votes of thanks are owed to SPP Information Officer Michael Anderson, Stanton Prize Coordinator Rebecca Saxe, all the other members of the Executive Committee.

We hope that in addition to enjoying the conference itself you'll have a chance to explore the campus and Portland. We also hope that you will plan on joining us next year for the second joint meeting of the SPP with ESPP, in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 6-10 July 2011!

Becko Copenhaver, Local Host
Bertram Malle, President
Louise Antony, President-Elect
Portland, June 2010

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Ron Mallon and Jen Cole Wright

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2010 MEETING

Becko Copenhaver

ESPP LIAISON

Brian Keeley

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2011 MEETING

Luc Faucher

The Society for Philosophy and Psychology is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable organization. For more information about joining or donating to the SPP, please contact the Secretary-Treasurer at sppsectreas@gmail.com

<http://www.socphilpsych.org>

GENERAL INFORMATION

Book and Publisher Exhibit

Exhibits during conference hours in the registration area, Howard Hall 115.

- Cambridge University Press
- John Benjamins
- The MIT Press, editor Philip Laughlin
- Penguin Group (USA)
- Routledge / Taylor and Francis, editor Andrew Beck
- Springer
- Wiley-Blackwell

Campus Safety and Emergency Information

Emergency: (503) 768-7777

Office Hours

Open 24 Hours, Holidays Excepted

Campus Safety Officers are on duty 24 hours, 365 days

Business phone: (503) 768-7855

Email: safety@lclark.edu

Fitness, Childcare, and Business Services

Please contact the Benson Hotel: 503-228-2000 or concierge@bensonhotel.com

Alcohol

All visitors are subject to Lewis and Clark College alcohol policies. Alcohol will be available at some catered events, but may not be removed from the event room. Walking across campus with alcoholic beverages is prohibited.

Internet Access

Campus wireless Internet access will be provided to all conference attendees. The necessary information for connecting to the campus network will be provided at registration. Internet access is also available at the Benson Hotel.

LOCAL TRANSPORTATION

Public transportation between the Benson Hotel and the Lewis & Clark campus is available during the week, but will also be supplemented with charter bus service for early morning and after-hours travel. Public buses do not run to Lewis & Clark on the weekends, so charter buses and private transportation are the Saturday options.

Bus times and routes can be found by using the Trimet trip planner:

<http://trimet.org/go/cgi-bin/plantrip.cgi>

(Just enter the Benson Hotel as your starting point and Lewis & Clark College as the end point and it will generate a route for you and give you an approximate time.)

If a taxi service is needed, the recommended service is Radio Cab: 502-227-1212.

CHARTER BUS SCHEDULE

The charter bus service has scheduled two morning and two evening trips, as follows:

6/9. Wednesday morning, depart Benson Hotel:	6:45am, 7:25am
6/9. Wednesday evening, depart L&C:	7:30pm, 8:15pm
6/10. Thursday morning, depart Benson Hotel:	7:00am, 7:45am
6/10. Thursday evening, depart L&C:	7:30pm, 8:15pm
6/11. Friday morning, depart Benson Hotel:	7:00am, 8:10am
6/11. Friday evening, depart L&C:	6:45pm, 7:30pm
6/12. Saturday morning, depart Benson Hotel:	7:45am, 8:30am
6/12. Saturday evening, depart L&C:	7:30pm, 8:00pm

Program of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology

June 9-12, 2010
Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon

ALL DAYS: REGISTRATION AND BOOK DISPLAY

HOWARD 115

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9

- 7:45-4:00 Pre-conference Workshop: Howard 102
The Psychology and Philosophy of Morality
Box lunch included in the workshop registration fee
- Fiery Cushman, Harvard University / Brown University
Julia Driver, Washington University in St. Louis
Susan Dwyer, University of Maryland, Baltimore County
Joshua Knobe, Yale University
Debra Lieberman, University of Miami
Thomas Nadelhoffer, Dickinson College / Duke University
David Pizarro, Cornell University
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University
Jen Wright, College of Charleston
Liane Young, MIT / Boston College
- 4:20-4:30 SPP 2010 Conference Welcome Council Chambers
- 4:30-5:45 Invited Speaker Council Chambers
- Chair: Ron Mallon, University of Utah
- Stephen Stich, Rutgers University, & Wesley Buckwalter, CUNY Graduate
Center, Gender and Philosophical Intuitions: Why Are There So Few Women
in Philosophy?
- 5:45-6:30 Poster Madness! Council Chambers
- 6:30-7:30 Poster Session 1 and Reception Howard Halls

THURSDAY, JUNE 10

- 8:00-8:30 Coffee/Light Breakfast
- 8:30-9:45 Invited Speaker Council Chambers
Chair: Jen Cole Wright, College of Charleston
Linda Skitka, University of Illinois at Chicago, The Social and Political Implications of Moral Conviction
- 9:45-9:55 Break
- 9:55-11:55 Invited Symposium: Cognizing Human Groups Council Chambers
Chair: Colin Allen, Indiana University
Katie Kinzler, University of Chicago, The Native Language of Social Cognition
Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburg, The Folk Concept of Race
- 11:55-1:10 Lunch Break Fields Dining Hall
SPP Diversity Committee Meeting Smith Hall
- 1:10-2:10 On the Cutting Edge, Session 1 Howard 102
Chair: David Rose, Carnegie-Mellon University
Jonathan Phillips, Yale University, Luke Misenheimer, University of California, Berkeley, & Joshua Knobe, Yale University, Love and Happiness
Jennifer Zamzow, University of Arizona, Perspective Taking in Moral Judgments
Steve Guglielmo, Andrew Monroe, & Kyle Dillon, Brown University, Coming Up Short vs. Going Too Far: Different Thresholds for Evaluating Mind & Morality

- 1:10-2:10 On the Cutting Edge, Session 2 Howard 259
- Chair: Carol Suchy-Dicey, Boston University
- Whit Schonbein, College of Charleston, Linguistic Scaffolding, Artificial Neural Networks, and Formal Languages
- Michael Anderson, Franklin and Marshall College, & Tim Oates, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, A Critique of Multi-Voxel Pattern Analysis
- John Ritchie, University of Maryland, College Park, The Blindspot of Consciousness
- 2:10-2:20 Break
- 2:20-4:10 Contributed Session 1: Cognitive Science Howard 102
- Chair: S. Kate Devitt, Rutgers University
- Matt Barker, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Reorienting the Extended Cognition Debate
- Commentator: Rob Rupert, University of Colorado
- Nigel Stepp, University of Connecticut, Tony Chemero, Franklin and Marshall College, & Michael Turvey, University of Connecticut, Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science
- Commentator: William Ramsey, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
- 2:20-4:10 Contributed Session 2: Concepts Howard 259
- Chair: Kranti Saran, Harvard University
- Iris Oved, University of Arizona, Baptizing Meanings for Concepts
- Commentator: Carrie Figdor, University of Iowa
- Jennifer Matey, Florida International University, Can Blue Mean Four
- Commentator: Uriah Kriegel, University of Arizona
- 4:10-4:20 Break

- 4:20-6:10 Contributed Session 3: Free Will Howard 102
- Chair: Carrie Figdor, University of Iowa
- Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias, Georgia State University, Further Studies on Folk Intuitions about Free Will
- Commentator: Jonathan Weinberg, Indiana University
- Nadya Chernyak & Tamar Kushnir, Cornell University, Developing Notions of Free Will: Preschoolers' Understanding of How Intangible Constraints Bind Their Freedom
- ☆☆ Winner of the William James Prize ☆☆*
- Commentator: Nina Strohminger, University of Michigan
- 4:20-6:10 Contributed Session 4: Concepts/Language Howard 259
- Chair: J. Brendan Ritchie, University of Maryland, College Park
- Justyna Grudzinska, Rutgers University, The Role of Referential Context in Language Learning and Processing
- Commentator: Sandeep Prasada, Hunter College
- James Genone, Stanford University, & Tania Lombrozo, University of California, Berkeley, Concept Attribution and Conceptual Structure
- Commentator: Michael Devitt, CUNY Graduate Center
- 6:10-7:30 Poster Session 2 and Reception Howard Halls

FRIDAY, JUNE 11

8:30-9:00 Coffee/Light Breakfast

9:00-12:00 Invited Symposium 2: The Neuroscience of Lying Council Chambers

Chair: Charles Wallis, California State University Long Beach

Joshua Green, Harvard University, Will or Grace? On the Cognitive Nature of (Dis)Honesty

John-Dylan Haynes, Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Berlin, Decoding Mental States from Brain Activity: From Basic Science to Applied Neurotechnology

Adina Roskies, Dartmouth College, Title TBA

12:00-1:15 Lunch Fields Dining Hall

Executive Committee Meeting Howard 302

1:15-2:15 On the Cutting Edge, Session 3 Howard 102

Chair: Bertram Malle, Brown University

Chris Weigel, Utah Valley University, Distance, Anger, Freedom: An Abstraction Account of Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Intuitions

Mark Alicke, Ohio University, David Rose, Carnegie-Mellon University, & Dori Bloom, Ohio University, Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control

Fiery Cushman, Harvard University, & Eric Schwitzgebel, University of California, Riverside, The Effects of Bias and Expertise in Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study

1:15-2:15 On the Cutting Edge, Session 4 Howard 259

Chair: Ellie Wang, Indiana University

Marshall Willman, New York Institute of Technology, The Somatic Marker Debate: A Philosophical Diagnosis

Justine Kao, Robert Ryan, Melody Dye, & Michael Ramscar, Stanford University, An Acquired Taste: How Reading Literature Affects Sensitivity to Word Distributions when Judging Literary Texts

David Rose, Carnegie-Mellon University, A New Theory of Folk Causal Judgments: The Evaluative Theory

2:15-2:25 Break

2:25-5:10 Contributed Session 5: Intentionality, Biases, & Aliefs Howard 102

Chair: Joshua Alexander, Siena College

Matthew Haug, College of William & Mary, Explaining the Placebo Effect:
Aliefs, Beliefs, and Conditioning

Commentator: Stephen Crowley, Boise State University

Sarah Wellen & David Danks, Carnegie-Mellon University, The Actor-Observer
Hypothesis and Judgments of Intentionality

Commentator: Thomas Nadelhoffer, Dickinson College

J.S. Swindell, Baylor College of Medicine, Biases and Heuristics in Decision-
Making and their Impact on Autonomy

Commentator: Alex Plakias, University of Michigan

2:25-5:10 Contributed Session 6: Moral Judgment Howard 259

Chair: Deborah Mower, Youngstown State University

Tamler Sommers, University of Houston, Moral Responsibility & Human
Diversity

Commentator: Steve Downes, University of Utah

Derek Leben, Johns Hopkins University, Cognitive Neuroscience & Moral
Decision Making

Commentator: Liane Young, MIT

David Shoemaker, Tulane University, Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the
Moral/Conventional Distinction

Commentator: Dan Kelly, Purdue University

5:10-5:20 Break

5:20-6:35 Stanton Prize Lecture Council Chambers

Chair: Bertram Malle, Brown University

Tania Lombrozo, University of California, Berkeley
Explaining Explanation

SATURDAY, JUNE 12

- 8:30-9:00 Coffee/Light Breakfast
- 9:00-10:15 Invited Speaker 3 Council Chambers
Chair: Joshua Knobe, Yale University
Keith Stanovich, University of Toronto, Individual Differences in Rational Thought
- 10:15-12:15 Invited Symposium 3: Perceiving Objects Council Chambers
Chair: Kevin Uttich, University of California, Berkeley
Brian Scholl, Yale University, It's Alive! Perceiving Intentional Objects
Casey O'Callaghan, Rice University, Multimodal Object Perception
- 12:15-1:30 Lunch and SPP Business Meeting Council Chambers
Saturday box lunch included in the registration fee
- 1:30-2:30 On the Cutting Edge, Session 5 Howard 102
Chair: Taylor Davis, University of British Columbia
Katya Saunders, Deena Skolnick Weisberg & Alan M. Leslie, Rutgers University, Moral Judgments in Preschoolers
Henrike Moll, Max Planck Institute, Taking versus Confronting Perspectives: A Developmental Story
Caren Walker, Boston College; Thomas Wartenberg, Mt. Holyoke; & Ellen Winner, Boston College, Teaching Children Philosophy: Effects on Epistemological Understanding

1:30-2:30	<p>On the Cutting Edge, Session 6</p> <p>Chair: Guy Dove, University of Louisville</p> <p>Jorge Morales, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM/Universidad Panamericana, Animal Reasoning: A Solution to the Problem of Negation and Representations of Absence</p> <p>Michael Weisberg, University of Pennsylvania, Agent-based Models of Cognitive Labor</p> <p>S. Matthew Liao, New York University, Alex Wiegmann, University of Gottingen, Joshua Alexander, Siena College, and Gerard Vong, Oxford University, The Loop Case and Order Effect</p>	Howard 259
2:30-2:40	Break	
2:40-5:40	<p>Invited Symposium 4: Creativity & Imagination</p> <p>Chair: Michael Anderson, Franklin & Marshall College</p> <p>Elliot Paul, Barnard College, & Scott Barry Kaufman, New York University, Imagination: A Neglected Virtue</p> <p>Liane Gabora, University of British Columbia, How does the creative process work?</p> <p>Matthew Kieran, University of Leeds, Creativity: Motivation and Virtue</p>	Council Chambers
5:40-6:20	Presidential Reception	Council Chambers Foyer
6:20-7:20	<p>Presidential Address</p> <p>Chair: Louise Antony, University of Massachusetts, Amherst</p> <p>Bertram Malle, Brown University Title TBA</p>	Council Chambers

POSTERS

Suzanne Benack and Tom Swan, Union College, Siena College, On The Impossibility Of Being Good: Threats To Moral Self-Evaluation In Post-Modern Culture

Cameron Buckner, Jonathan Weinberg and Derek Jones, Indiana University-Bloomington, X-Phi Beyond The Survey: Heuristics And Reflection

Jill Cumby and Craig Roxborough, York University, Knowledge Ascriptions, Reliabilism And Scepticism About Intuitions

David Danks and David Rose, Carnegie Mellon University, Clarifying Reference And Evaluation

Taylor Davis, University of British Columbia, The Cognitive Science Of Science: Hypothetical Reasoning And Inference To The Best Explanation

Felipe De Brigard, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Memory Is Not For Remembering

William Brady and Felipe De Brigard, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Responsibility And The Principle Of Alternative Future Possibilities

S. Kate Devitt, Rutgers University, A Bayesian Model Of Source Monitoring

Dobri Dotov, Lin Nie and Tony Chemero, University of Connecticut, Franklin and Marshall College, Franklin and Marshall College, Heidegger In The Lab

Guy Dove, University of Louisville, Development And The Acquisition Of Grammar

David Fajardo-Chica, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Some Difficulties On X-Phi About Consciousness

Michael Ferreira, The Ohio State University, On A Prima Facie Problem With The New Cognitive Theory Of The Propositional Imagination

Joseph Hedger, Syracuse University/Arizona State University, How We Understand Our Own Mental States: The Private Language Argument Is Supported By Findings In Developmental Psychology

Steven Horst, Wesleyan University, Whose Intuitions? Which Dualism?

Madison Kilbride, Bates College, The Objects Of Speech Perception

Revanth Kosaraju, Michael Ramscar and Melody Dye, Harker School, Stanford University, Stanford University, The Predictability And Abstractness Of Language: A Study In Understanding And Usage Of The English Language Through Probabilistic Modeling And Frequency

Jonathan Livengood, Justin Sytsma and David Rose, University of Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie Mellon University, Folk Intuitions And Theories Of Actual Causation: A Hitch In Hitchcock's Account

Theresa Lopez, University of Arizona,
Against The Evolutionary Argument For
Moral Skepticism

Jason Kido Lopez and Matthew J Fuxjager,
Indiana University-Bloomington,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, The
Adaptive Value Of Self-Deception

Deborah Mower, Youngstown State
University, Situationism And The
Embeddedness Model Of Confucian
Virtue Ethics

Artur Nilsson, Lund University and New
York University, Polarity Theory And
The Structure Of The Personal
Worldview

Matthew Rellihan, Seattle University,
Adaptationism And Adaptive Thinking
In Evolutionary Psychology

Collin Rice, University of Missouri, Is
Language Really The Content-
Integrator?

John Ritchie and Thomas Carlson,
University of Maryland, College Park,
Mirror, Mirror, On The Wall, Is That
Even My Hand At All? Changes In The
Afterimage Of One's Reflection In A
Mirror In Response To Bodily
Movement

Kranti Saran, Harvard University, Must All
Bodily Sensations Be Felt To Be
Located On The Body?

John Spackman, Middlebury College,
Conceptualism And The Richness Of
Perceptual Content

Carolyn Suchy-Dacey, Boston University,
Experiential Richness: Beyond the Grasp
of Attention?

Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood and
David Rose, University of Pittsburgh,
University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie
Mellon University, Two Types Of
Typicality: Rethinking The Role Of
Statistical Typicality In Folk Causal
Attributions

Bradley Thomas, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan
Murray, University of Iowa, Georgia
State University, Georgia State
University, The Influence Of Moral
Judgments On Epistemic Intuitions
About Moral Dilemmas

Kevin Uttich and Tania Lombrozo,
University of California-Berkeley,
Reversing The Side-Effect Effect: A
Rational Explanation

Staci Wade, Jacqueline Randall, Michael
Crockett, Derrin Fukuda, James Maxson
and Johan Rosqvist, Pacific University,
Two To Tango: Understanding The
Dance Of Training And Theory

Charles Wallis and John Clevenger,
California State University-Long Beach,
The Counter Intuitive Disharmony Of
Intuition Research In The Cognitive
Sciences

Ellie Hua Wang, Indiana University-
Bloomington, Virtues As Robust Traits:
An Analysis Of Doris's Situationist
Challenge

ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS FOR CONTRIBUTED SESSIONS

alphabetically by first author

Reorienting the Extended Cognition Debate

Matt Barker

One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows the debate has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations to support claims about where cognition is. Empirical considerations should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. We need, I conclude, to step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is.

Developing Notions of Free Will: Preschoolers' Understanding of How Intangible Constraints Bind Their Freedom of Choice

Nadia Chernyak and Tamar Kushnir

Our folk psychology involves the ability to reason about freedom of choice. While the free-will vs. determinism debate has largely been studied in philosophy, little work has addressed young children's intuitive notions of freedom of choice and constraint. In a series of experiments, we looked at young children's understandings of the actions that constrain their freedom of choice by asking preschoolers (Range: 4 y; 1 mo. – 5 y; 7 mo.) whether they had the choice to have done otherwise when they did not have the necessary knowledge to do so (epistemic constraint), had the moral duty not to do so (moral constraint), preferred not to do so (preference constraint), were told not to do so (permissive constraint), or were told that everyone else did not do so (conformist constraint). Results suggest that while preschool children generally believe their actions are freely chosen, they already understand how moral rules and personal preferences may determine their actions. Additionally, we find that children transition into understanding epistemic (Studies 1 and 2), permissive, and conformist constraints (Study 3) around the ages of 4-5. These results have implications for children's developing notions of free will and moral reasoning.

Concept Attribution and Conceptual Structure

James Genone and Tania

Lombrozo http://www.easychair.org/conferences/submission_download.cgi?a=c076be004b85;submission=330124

Recent debates about the nature of semantic reference have tended to focus on two competing approaches: theories which emphasize the importance of the descriptive information associated with a referring term, and those which emphasize the causal facts about the conditions under which the use of the term originated and was passed on. We discuss the relevance of such theories for understanding concepts, and in particular for resolving a problem with descriptive approaches to concept possession—namely, that it seems possible to possess a concept despite associating incomplete or false descriptive information with it. Recent empirical work on reference by Eduard Machery and his colleagues suggests that both causal and descriptive information may play a role in judgments about reference, though their findings of cross-cultural variation in individuals judgments imply differences between subjects in use of such information. We also propose that both descriptive and causal information play a role in folk intuitions about reference and concept possession, and report two novel experiments that support this proposal. Our findings of inconsistencies within subjects when it comes to use of causal and descriptive information, however, suggest that the contrast between causal and descriptive theories of reference may be inappropriate. We suggest that intuitions may instead support a hybrid theory of reference that includes both causal and descriptive factors. Our findings have implications for semantic theories of reference, as well as for theories of conceptual structure.

The Role of Referential Context in Language Learning and Processing

Justyna Grudzinska

Recent experimental work by Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill and Logrip reported some striking developmental differences in sentence processing ability. In contrast to adults, young children appear to be insensitive to referential cues when resolving syntactic ambiguities (Trueswell et al., 1999). This poses a puzzle because children's earliest communication is heavily context-dependent. In my paper, I will make an attempt to offer a solution to the puzzle. Drawing on neurological findings, as well as evidence from patients with brain damage, I will argue that there are two principles regulating disambiguation: (1) principle used to resolve conflicts in the mapping of words on the representations of the world (referential ambiguities) and (2) principle used to resolve conflicts of linguistic representations (syntactic ambiguities).

Explaining the Placebo Effect: Aliefs, Beliefs, and Conditioning

Matthew Haug

The placebo effect has become a hot topic in psychology and neuroscience. Much of the best recent work has focused on placebo analgesia, although good evidence exists that placebo effects occur for a wide variety of conditions: from Parkinson's disease to immune responses. There are a number of competing psychological accounts of the placebo effect, and much of the recent debate centers on the relative importance of classical conditioning and conscious beliefs. In this paper, I discuss apparent problems with these accounts and with "disjunctive" accounts that deny that placebo effects can be given a unified psychological explanation. The fact that some placebo effects seem to be mediated by cognitive states with content that is consciously inaccessible and inferentially isolated from a subject's beliefs motivates an account of the placebo effect in terms of subdoxastic cognitive states. I propose that aliefs, subdoxastic cognitive states that are associative, automatic, and arational, can provide a unified psychological account of the placebo effect.

Cognitive Neuroscience and Moral Decision Making

Derek Leben

The last ten years have seen an explosion of research in the emerging "cognitive neuroscience of morality," revealing what appears to be a functional network for the moral appraisal of situations. However, there is a surprising disagreement amongst researchers about the significance of this for moral actions, decisions, and behavior. Gazzaniga (2005) believes that we should "uncover those ethics [that are "built into our brains"], identify them, and live more fully by them," while Greene (2002) believes that we should often do the opposite, viewing the cognitive neuroscience of morality more like a science of pathology. To analyze and evaluate this disagreement, this paper will argue that establishing the cognitive-neural basis of moral appraisals is not necessarily identifying these as the only possible or the best causes of moral decisions. This will involve drawing a theoretical distinction between the underlying causes of moral appraisals and decisions made in the interests of others (what Greene calls 'moral1' and 'moral2,' respectively), employing a strong analogy to 'folk physics' and scientific physics. Assuming such a theoretical distinction is possible, the empirical arguments will show that it is not only possible to separate moral decisions from the underlying basis for moral appraisal, but often preferable. Continuing the comparison to folk physics, these cognitive-neural systems are not eliminable, but can be 'overridden' or 'drowned out.' Further, we will consider cases where guiding one's decisions according to these appraisals leads to decisions that are objectively counterproductive or even harmful. The conclusions will side with Greene's approach, with the interesting result that there might be less that the cognitive sciences can reveal about moral decisions than recent excitement might have us believe.

Can Blue Mean Four

Jennifer Matey

In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have defended the view that conscious perceptual experiences have content on account of their phenomenal characters (Chalmers 2004, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Siegel 2005, Siewert 1998). One still relatively under-explored issue, however, concerns what sort of information the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is capable of representing. Positions on this issue fall into two general categories. Conservative views hold that only directly sensible properties such as colors, shapes and the spatial relations among these properties are represented in perceptual experience (Tye 1995, Dretske 1995). The liberal position on the other hand, holds that information over and above these properties can be perceptually represented. This paper presents a counterexample to conservative views, drawing on the visuo-perceptual phenomenon of higher-grapheme color synaesthesia.

Further Studies on Folk Intuitions about Free Will: 9 out of 10 People Prefer Compatibilism

Dylan Murray and Eddy Nahmias

Previous experimental philosophy research has yielded conflicting results about whether the folk are compatibilists or incompatibilists. Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006) found that most participants judge that agents in deterministic scenarios can act of their own free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that these apparent compatibilist responses may be performance errors produced by using concrete scenarios that involve high affect, when in fact people's underlying theory of free will is incompatibilist. Here, we argue that this interpretation of the results is flawed and we present results from two new studies that suggest that people's apparent incompatibilist, rather than apparent compatibilist judgments, are the product of error. In Study 1, we find that most participants offer compatibilist responses unless they mistakenly interpret determinism as the thesis that one's rational and conscious mental states are bypassed in the causal chain that leads to one's behavior. Because determinism does not entail bypassing, these apparent incompatibilist judgments based on the belief that bypassing threatens free will do not express genuine incompatibilist intuitions. In Study 2, we find that among 'competent' participants – those who do not conflate determinism with bypassing but who do understand that determinism does entail that it is not possible, given the actual past and laws, for future events to occur otherwise than they actually do – 9 out of 10 participants have compatibilist intuitions.

Baptizing Meanings for Concepts

Iris Oved

This paper explores a theory of concept acquisition that aims to appease tensions in the debate between Lexical Concept Empiricism and Lexical Concept Nativism. I describe a process, Baptizing Meanings for Concepts (BMC), in which concepts are acquired by (1) formulating a mental description that posits a newly discovered kind to explain patterns in perceptual experience, and then (2) assigning a new simple mental name to the kind that is posited by the mental description. This process, I propose, allows for the acquisition of many lexical concepts via perception and inference, while yielding the concepts simple, in the sense that they are not themselves composed by any other concepts. The BMC is closely connected to the Kripke/Putnam/Burge/Soames process for assigning meanings to linguistic terms. The idea of mental baptism is not a novel one; many discussions of the linguistic process gesture at a mental version, either as a direct mental analogue of the linguistic version, or else as a prerequisite part of the linguistic process. It is only by developing a detailed model, however, that we see the challenges that are faced in carrying out such baptisms. Working out a model, moreover, is what reveals this overlooked solution to the on-going concepts debate.

Psychopathy, Responsibility, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction

David Shoemaker

In many current discussions of the moral and criminal responsibility of psychopaths, the moral/conventional distinction bears a great deal of weight, albeit for strikingly different conclusions. For some theorists, psychopaths' failure to distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions suggests that they are not capable of the sort of normative understanding necessary for either moral or criminal responsibility. For others, psychopaths' responses to the moral/conventional distinction ground just the opposite conclusion: while their viewing all transgressions on an evaluative par exhibits some impairment in practical reason—indeed, it exhibits a moral disorder—it also exhibits an ability to recognize and respond to at least one category of reasons against acting in certain ways, a category that counts as moral and thus could ground both their criminal and moral responsibility.

In this paper I will show that the moral/conventional distinction simply cannot bear the sort of weight these theorists (and others) have placed on it. After having revealed the fractured nature of the distinction, though, I will go on to suggest how one aspect of it may remain relevant—in a way that has previously been unappreciated—to work on the responsibility (both moral and criminal) of psychopaths.

Moral Responsibility and Human Diversity

Tamler Sommers

Contemporary philosophical theories of moral responsibility share two features in common. First, they provide conditions for appropriate assignments of moral responsibility that are meant to apply universally, for all agents, for all societies. Second, they appeal to intuitions about cases and principles to justify these conditions. These features require the theories to make empirical assumptions about the uniformity of human psychology. This paper outlines a challenge to these assumptions. I argue that responsibility norms within a group emerge as a response to different features of the group's social and physical environment. These norms give rise to the differences in core intuitions and beliefs concerning when it is fair to blame, praise, punish, and reward ourselves and others. It is therefore unlikely that human beings across cultures would reach the same considered judgments about the conditions for moral responsibility.

Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science

Nigel Stepp, Tony Chemero, and Michael Turvey

Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel's (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically-oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of non-representational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp and Turvey 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to non-representational, dynamical cognitive science.

Biases and Heuristics in Decision-Making and their Impact on Autonomy

J.S. Swindell

Behavioral psychologists have identified a wide range of biases in human decision-making. This research has important implications for the notion of autonomous decision-making. This paper contributes to the discussion by categorizing the biases into two useful conceptual categories relevant to autonomous decision making by persons, providing specific examples under each major category, and then precisely explicating the ways in which the various biases affect autonomous decision-making.

The Actor-Observer Hypothesis and Judgments of Intentionality

Sarah Wellen and David Danks

Recent empirical research suggests that moral evaluations of actions can influence whether they are judged to be intentional: people tend to say that negative side-effects are intentionally performed whereas positive side-effects are not. However, the literature on this 'Side-Effect effect' has been carried out using only one methodology, and it is thus unclear whether and how this phenomenon will generalize to other contexts. This paper presents an empirical test of this phenomenon in two previously unexamined contexts: (i) judgments of real (vs. hypothetical) actions, and (ii) judgments about one's own actions. Other judgments, particularly causal explanations, have been shown to vary systematically between actors and observers, and have been shown to differ depending on whether the action to be explained is real or hypothetical. The results of our study suggest that actors, as opposed to observers, tend to show a reverse Side-Effect effect; actors judge that (real) positive side-effects are intentional whereas negative ones are not. The observers in our study did not display the standard Side-Effect effect in response to real actions, and we consider possible explanations for this result. We argue that our results provide evidence that the Side-Effect effect is driven by the same mechanisms underlying asymmetries in causal attribution. We conclude by briefly discussing the implications of these results for accounts of the Side-Effect effect, and by suggesting some directions for further research.

Lewis & Clark Campus Map

- ### Law Campus
- L1 Legal Research Center
 - L2A Boley Law Library
 - L2B Wood Hall
 - L3 McCarty Classroom Complex
 - L4 Gantenbein

Undergraduate Campus


- 1 Griswold Stadium
- 2 Tennis Courts (Indoor)
- 3 Pamplin Sports Center
- 4 Zehnbauser Swimming Pavilion
- 5 J.R. Howard Hall
- 10 Evans Music Center
- 11 Biology-Psychology
- 12 BODDine
- 14 Albany Quadrangle (includes Smith Hall)
- 15 Fir Acres Theatre
- 17 Olin Center for Physics and Chemistry
- 18 Greenhouse
- 19 Telescope
- 20 Alumni Circle
- 21 Tennis Court (Outdoor)
- 22 Rose Garden
- 23 Outdoor Pool and Dressing Pavilion
- 24 Fields Center for the Visual Arts
- 25 Miller Center for the Humanities
- 26 Watzek Library
- 26S Hoffman Gallery of Contemporary Art
- 27 Estate Gardens
- 28 Frank Manor House
- 29 Flanagan Chapel
- 30 Campus Safety
- 32 Odell Alumni Gatehouse
- 36 Templeton Campus Center
- 46 McAfee
- 47 Facilities Services
- 47A Facilities Services Administration
- 51 Heating and Cooling Plant
- 61 Huston Sports Complex

Residence Halls

- 33 Akin
- 34 Stewart
- 35 Odell
- 40 West
- 41 Roberts
- 42 East
- 43 Howard
- 44 Platt (West and East)
- 45 Copeland (A-G)
- 49 Hartzfield (A-D)
- 50 Forest (Alder, Juniper, Manzanita, Ponderosa, Spruce, Tamarack)

Graduate Campus

- 81A South Chapel
- 81B South Chapel Annex
- 82 Corbett House
- 83 Rogers Hall
- 84 Sequoia
- 85 Conference Center



Buildings and Features

Albany Quadrangle 14
 Alumni Circle 20
 Biology–Psychology 11
 Boley Law Library L2A
 Bodine 12
 Campus Safety 30
 Conference Center 85
 Corbett House 82
 Council Chamber 36
 Estate Gardens 27
 Evans Music Center 10
 Facilities Services 47
 Facilities Services Administration 47A
 Fields Center for the Visual Arts 24
 Fir Acres Theatre 15
 Flanagan Chapel 29
 Frank Manor House 28
 Gartenbein L4
 Greenhouse 18
 Griswold Stadium 1
 Heating and Cooling Plant 51
 Hoffman Gallery of Contemporary Art 26S
 J.R. Howard Hall 5
 Huston Sports Complex 61
 Legal Research Center L1
 McAfee 46
 McCarty Classroom Complex L3
 Miller Center for the Humanities 25
 Odell Alumni Gatehouse 32
 Olin Center for Physics and Chemistry 17
 Outdoor Pool and Dressing Pavilion 23
 Pamplin Sports Center 3
 Rogers Hall 83
 Rose Garden 22
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 South Chapel 81A
 South Chapel Annex 81B
 Telescope 19
 Templeton Campus Center 36
 Tennis Courts 2, 21
 Watzek Library 26
 Wood Hall L2B
 Zehntbauer Swimming Pavilion 4

Residence Halls


Akin 33
 Copeland (A-G) 45
 East 42
 Forest (Alder, Juniper, Manzanita, Ponderosa, Spruce, Tamarack) 50
 Hartzfeld (A-D) 49
 Howard 43
 Odell 35
 Platt (West and East) 44
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Routes to Campus



Parking

Parking permits are required during the fall and spring semesters, Monday through Friday from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. Parking is free after 7 p.m. weekdays and all day on weekends. During the summer, permits are required only for parking on the Law and Graduate Campuses. Reserved parking for disabled visitors is available on all campuses. Campus Safety can assist in locating a space.

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